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F uel taxation policy in Chile has always been to keep taxes on 
diesel lower than those on gasoline. The proportion of automobiles with 
diesel engines has grown considerably as a result. Just 20% of diesel 
engine emissions are equivalent to 80% of gasoline engine emissions, 
and this affects the level of externalities associated with automobile use, 
especially in cities such as Santiago where pollution levels are high. This 
study estimates the effect of the fuel tax differential on automobile demand. 
The findings indicate diesel automobile demand elasticities of -3.4 and 2.1 
with respect to the price of the vehicle and the tax differential. The scale 
of these effects means there is scope for substantial emissions cuts by 
way of tax changes to equalize gasoline and diesel tax rates and create 
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In Chile, the government has greatly increased the 
specific tax on gasoline over the past 20 years while 
keeping the specific tax on diesel unchanged. The 
basic motive has simply been to increase or recoup 
tax revenues; because demand for fuel is assumed to 
be fairly inelastic, the thinking is that the distortions 
caused by taxation should be minimized by applying 
it in these markets. Proportionally equivalent 
increases in all fuel markets would be the natural 
outcome of this logic, but gasoline taxes have risen 
by proportionally more than the tax on diesel, thus 
changing the relative prices of the two. In 1990, the 
gasoline tax was increased from 3 utm per cubic metre 
to 3.6186 utm.1 It was then raised to 4.4084 utm in 
1995, 5.2 utm in 2000 and 6 utm in 2001. In 2008 it 
was cut first to 4.5 utm in March and then to 3.5 utm 
in September. Throughout, the tax on diesel has been 
held at 1.5 utm per cubic metre.
This relative price change deriving from tax 
policy in fuel markets has had two effects. The first 
has been an increase in the consumption of diesel 
relative to gasoline in all uses for which the two fuels 
are substitutes. The second has been an incentive to 
purchase diesel rather than gasoline cars. Imports 
of diesel-powered light passenger vehicles rose from 
13,646 units in 1997 to 61,433 in 2007. Similarly, the 
total fleet of diesel automobiles rose from 267,341 
units in 2002 to 566,122 in 2008, i.e., there was an 
increase of  112% in six years, while the fleet of 
gasoline automobiles grew by 30% in the same period. 
The diesel and gasoline automobile fleets thus grew 
by 13.3% and 4.5% a year between 2002 and 2008, 
respectively. The result, as figure 1 shows, is that the 
share of diesel automobiles in the total has grown 
steadily over recent years, rising from 12.7% in 2002 
to 19.2% in 2008 in the country as a whole, and from 
9.1% to 14.4% in the Metropolitan Region over the 
same period.
This change in the composition of the automobile 
fleet is important because of  the externalities 
automobile use produces. There are externalities 
1  The monthly tax unit (utm) is an index used to maintain the 
value of taxes in constant money. In June 2010, one utm was 
worth 37,083 Chilean pesos.
such as road congestion and traffic accidents that are 
unconnected with the type of engine in the automobile, 
so that different tax treatment for different fuel types 
ought not to affect their level directly.2 However, there 
are externalities such as air pollution from emissions 
that are related to the type of engine.
Given that pollution from an automobile creates 
an external cost for society which automobile owners 
and users do not take into account in their decision-
making, tax policy can play an important part in 
internalizing this cost. Three decisions are relevant 
here. The first is the number of  kilometres driven 
since it is this, in combination with the automobile’s 
emissions per kilometre travelled, that determines 
the total volume of pollution produced. The second 
is the type of fuel used by the automobile and the 
emissions associated with it. The third is the choice 
of vehicle characteristics that directly or indirectly 
affect emissions per kilometre travelled, such as the 
age of the car, its fuel efficiency (kilometres per litre), 
engine size, etc.
An optimal tax policy would be one that led 
to consumers incorporating external costs into 
their demand for automobiles, including fuel type. 
If  a vehicle’s emissions are proportional to its fuel 
consumption and do not depend on its design and 
engine type, as is the case with carbon dioxide emissions 
from automobiles, fuel use alone will determine the level 
of emissions and a tax per litre will allow consumers to 
internalize the social costs of their emissions. Thus, a 
gasoline tax encourages consumers to purchase smaller 
or more fuel-efficient vehicles, maintain them better 
and change their usage patterns (fewer kilometres 
travelled) to lower consumption (Portney and others, 
2003; West and Williams, 2004; Bento and others, 
2005). Furthermore, given that gasoline and leisure are 
relative complements, increasing the gasoline tax will 
increase the supply of labour, generating additional 
2  Tax rates obviously have a direct effect on levels of externalities, 
and potentially a considerable one. Thus, in the case of the United 
States, it has been estimated that an increase of US$ 1 per gallon 
(3.7854 litres) would cut gasoline consumption by between 15% and 
20%, mileage by between 11% and 12% and road accident deaths 
by between 16% and 18%, while an extra US$ 100 billion in taxes 
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efficiency gains (West and Williams, 2004). Conversely, 
increasing fuel economy standards encourages greater 
automobile use by reducing the cost per kilometre 
travelled (Thorpe, 1997).
Nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide emissions, 
on the other hand, are not proportional to fuel use 
but depend directly on a vehicle’s engine size and type. 
A catalytic diesel automobile emits between 0.6 and 
0.8 grams of nitrogen oxide (NOx) and between 0.04 
and 0.09 grams of particulate matter per kilometre, 
while a gasoline car with a catalytic converter emits 
about 0.1 grams of nitrogen oxide per kilometre and 
no particulate matter. What this works out at is that, 
on average, 20% of  diesel automobile emissions are 
equivalent to 80% of gasoline automobile emissions, 
making the pollution externalities of the two types 
of vehicle very different.
Given the environmental situation in some Chilean 
cities, the externalities generated by diesel vehicles 
are greater than those of  gasoline vehicles, which 
means that the difference in specific taxes favouring 
diesel is not consistent with a Pigovian tax approach 
designed to correct externalities. Broadly speaking, 
then, a tax treatment that favours diesel does not seem 
justifiable on environmental grounds (see, for example, 
Michaelis, 1995). In particular, emissions from diesel 
engines have major environmental disadvantages from 
the standpoint of urban air quality (Crawford and 
Smith, 1995). Even under the more demanding new 
standards for particulate matter established in Europe, 
there is evidence of negative effects on climate change 
(Jacobson, 2002) and on urban mortality (Mazzi and 
Dowlatabadi, 2007).
Other elements of taxation policy undoubtedly 
need to be considered for optimum gasoline taxes 
to be determined, particularly the role of diesel as a 
production input in some industries, but it is important 
to determine the effect of the current tax differential 
FIGURE 1
Chile: proportion of diesel-powered automobiles
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who generate greater externalities owing to their more 
intensive vehicle use.3
The objective of  this study is to estimate the 
elasticities of automobile demand by engine type in 
relation to price and specific fuel taxes. This is a first 
input of relevance for evaluating the effects of current 
tax policy on fuels in Chile and proposing tax changes 
to internalize external costs associated with automobile 
use, particularly as regards air pollution.
The remainder of the article continues as follows. 
Section II presents an automobile demand model 
together with methodological considerations for 
estimating it. Section III describes the data used in 
the empirical analysis. Section IV presents the findings 
of the estimation and section V concludes with some 
future research and policy recommendations.
3  There is evidence that this type of price discrimination by engine 
type is employed by vehicle manufacturers (Verboven, 2002). 
Between 75% and 90% of the price differential between diesel and 
gasoline automobiles appears to be due to price discrimination 
between heavy and light vehicle users.
It is also important to realize that consumers 
have the option of not buying an automobile (outside 
option). It is important for this option to be considered 
in the estimation of demand, because if  it did not 
exist then it would be possible to raise the prices of 
all automobiles uniformly without demand being 
affected, as relative prices would remain constant.
Estimating demand for differentiated products 
is complicated, chiefly because of the large number 
of parameters that have to be estimated. Where N 
different products are involved, N price elasticities and 
N(N-1) cross-price elasticities need to be estimated. 
This means that for most cases the econometric model 
is “overparameterized” and impossible to estimate. 
There are two ways of solving this problem. The first is 
to aggregate similar products until there are just a few 
product groups. The largest cost of this strategy is that 
some parameters which might be of interest are lost. 
on the composition of the automobile fleet in Chile in 
order to be able to identify its repercussions on certain 
cities with high levels of  environmental pollution, 
such as Santiago and Temuco. For this, the important 
question is how sensitive diesel automobile sales are 
to the relative specific taxes and vehicle prices. These 
two elements are complementary from the standpoint 
of optimal tax policy, since besides the fuel tax it is 
possible to use a tax on diesel automobiles to correct 
externalities. The reason is that diesel automobiles, 
while more expensive, use less fuel per kilometre, and 
willingness to pay for this characteristic varies by 
consumer type, depending on how the automobile is 
to be used (distance driven per year). A tax on diesel 
automobiles makes it possible to discriminate by 
consumer type, raising prices by more for consumers 
Demand functions are generally estimated using 
uniform prices for an industry’s products, and a 
single estimate for the price elasticity of  demand 
is obtained as a result. Such estimates are valid for 
homogeneous products, but they omit information 
that is important for an understanding of consumers’ 
substitution patterns in the case of differentiated or 
heterogeneous products. The reason is that differences 
between products translate into different demand 
elasticities, making it important when estimating 
them to take explicit account of the characteristics 
differentiating products from one another. This is true 
of automobile demand, since a consumer can choose 
between different vehicle makes and models. When 
deciding which automobile to buy, consumers compare 
different characteristics across the different makes 
and models available. Price is undoubtedly among the 
most important characteristics, but consumers will 
also consider the type of engine (gasoline or diesel), as 
this is a major determinant of the automobile’s annual 
running costs. Because consumers have to choose 
between different makes and models with engines of 
differing types and sizes, demand for automobiles is 
a demand for differentiated products.
II
An automobile demand model
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The second way is to model product choice explicitly. 
This approach is based on the work of McFadden 
(1974), who developed discrete choice models to 
characterize the choice of products by a consumer, 
and it is the one used in the present study.4
A second difficulty in estimating demand 
for differentiated products is the heterogeneity of 
consumers. If  consumers did not have different 
preferences they would all buy the same automobile, 
conditional upon income. This does not happen, though, 
because consumers have individual characteristics 
which lead them to prefer one model or make of 
automobile out of  all those available, and these 
characteristics somehow need to be incorporated 
into the demand model.
discrete choice
By contrast with a standard consumption model, where 
the quantity consumed is a continuous variable, what 
is analysed in a discrete choice model is a situation 
where the relevant consumption decision is discrete. 
In the case of  the decision to buy an automobile, 
for instance, the relevant thing is what automobile 
a consumer buys, rather than how many. To be able 
to estimate demand for goods or services that are 
consumed discretely, a discrete choice model relates each 
consumer’s choice statistically with his or her personal 
characteristics and the characteristics of the different 
products or services available to be chosen. In this 
way, the model can be used to estimate the likelihood 
of a consumer picking a specific alternative.5
To estimate models of this type it is necessary 
to specify, first, the indirect utility function of  a 
consumer i purchasing an automobile with an engine 
of type m (cylinder capacity and gasoline or diesel) 
in year t. Following Berry (1994) and Nevo (2000), 
this is defined as:
 U X P vimt mt mt mt t i
∗ ( , , , , ; )ξ τ θ  (1)
4  Using this approach, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995 and 1998) 
study strategic price interactions between automobile manufacturers 
in the United States; Nevo (2001) estimates demand for cereals 
in the United States; and Agostini (2007) and Agostini and Jalile 
(2009) estimate the effect of taxes on foreign investment in the 
United States and Latin America, respectively.
5  While the estimation may be carried out with data on individual 
consumer decisions, this is not a requirement for using these 
models and it can be done with aggregated market-level data for 
each alternative.
where X is a vector of  size k of  an automobile’s 
observable characteristics, ξ are an automobile’s 
unobservable characteristics, τ is the specific tax on 
the fuel used by the automobile, P is the automobile’s 
price, v are consumers’ individual characteristics and 
θ are the unknown parameters to be estimated.
A simple functional form used in the literature 
for the utility function (1) is:6
 U P X vimt mt t mt mt imt
∗ = + + + +α γτ β ξ  (2)
The functional form used in (2) assumes that the 
unobserved heterogeneity of consumers (the individual 
characteristics that determine their preferences) is 
captured by a random shock vimt.7 The choice of a 
specific functional form along with the assumptions 
made about the distribution of v have a considerable 
effect on patterns of substitution between products 
(Berry, 1994).
As noted earlier, it is important for the analysis 
to consider the possibility that the consumer may 
decide not to purchase an automobile (possibly 
deciding to purchase a motorcycle, use only public 
transport, etc.). The utility function of this outside 
alternative is defined as:
 U X viot ot ot ot i
∗ ( , , , , )ξ τ θ  (3)
and the specific functional form taken for this is:
 π ξiot ot iotv
∗ = +  (4)
The assumption implicit in this model is that 
consumers purchase just one automobile, namely the 
one that gives them the highest level of utility. Thus, 
consumer i will choose to purchase an automobile of 
engine type m if and only if that purchase provides him 
or her with the greatest utility of all the alternatives. 
In other words, if  the following condition is met:
6  See Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo 
(2000). The model is fairly general, however, and can be used with 
different specifications subject to minor adjustments.
7  A consumer is thus defined as a vector of specific shocks by 
automobile engine type: (viot, vi1t, …, viMt).
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α γτ β ξ α
γτ β ξ
P X v P
X v
mt t mt mt imt kt
t kt kt i
+ + + + ≥ +
+ + + kt
 (5)
for any k ≥ 0 and k ≠ m (k = 0 represents the outside 
option: an alternative that entails not buying an 
automobile).
Condition (5) implicitly defines a set of unobserved 
individual characteristics vimt leading to the choice
of automobile model/make m. This set is defined by:
 
A v v v k Mmt t i t mt imt kt ikt( ) | .... .δ δ δ= + ≥ + ∀ ={ }0  (6)
where δ α γτ β ξ. . . .t t t t tP X= + + +  is the mean utility
of each make/model.
In the case of  the outside option, the mean 
utility (δot) cannot be identified without making 
more assumptions or normalizing one of the makes 
of automobile. The simplest way of identifying it, 
and the standard alternative used in the literature, is 
to normalize  ξot at zero.
It is then possible, for a given set of parameters, 
to predict the market share of each engine type as a 
function of the characteristics of the automobile, its 
price, taxes and unknown parameters. The market share 
of model/make m in period t, Smt, is determined by the 
proportion of consumers for whom condition (5) is 
met, i.e., for whom consuming model m provides greater 
utility than any of the other alternatives, including 
the outside one. This proportion is determined by the 
likelihood of vit being in set Amt. Given a distribution 
function and a density for v, F(v) and f(v), respectively, 
the market share of model m in period t is:
 
s f v dvmt t Amt
δ. ( )( ) = ∫  (7)
In order to calculate the integral of  equation 
(7), it is necessary to assume a distribution for vimt. 
An assumption traditionally used in the literature is 
that vimt are independent and equally distributed in 
accordance with an Extreme Value Type I distribution 
function.8 In this case, the market share of engine 
type m is:
8  See, for example, McFadden (1974), Cardell and Dumbar (1980), 
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α γ1 1 τ β ξkt kt ktX+ +( )
 (8)
The estimation strategy consists in choosing 
the parameters that minimize the distance between 
the market shares predicted by the model and those 
observed, which means solving the following implicit 
equation system:9
 
s X P St t t t t t. . . . . ., , , ;τ δ θ( ) =  (9)
where s •t. (  ) are the market shares defined by equation 
(7) and S t.  are the observed market shares.
Equation (9) can now be resolved analytically 
to get:
 
δmt mt otS S= ( ) − ( )ln ln  (10)
where Smt and Sot are the market shares of engine type 
m and the outside option, respectively.
Thus, the aggregate demand equation to be 
estimated is:
 
ln lnS S P Xmt ot mt mt mt mt( ) − ( ) = + + +α γτ β ξ  (11)
The price elasticities of  the market shares, as 
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In summary, this model can be used to solve 
the problem of “overparameterization” of demand 
9  The integral of equation (7) can be calculated analytically using 
assumptions about the distribution of v.
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for differentiated products and makes it possible 
to obtain consistent estimators of  the elasticities 
concerned.10 Lastly, it is important to consider that
10  This model has been used in the literature by studies dealing 
with automobile and fuel markets. For example, Agras and 
Chapman (1999) estimate the impact of emissions standards and 
fuel taxation on total greenhouse gas emissions in the United 
the price variable might be endogenous (with Pmt, ξmt), 
in which case it is necessary to estimate equation (11) 
using instrumental variables.
States transport sector; Levinsohn (1996) estimates the effect of 
different trade policies on automobile sales; and Greene (1986) 




data used in the empirical analysis
The empirical analysis uses monthly data on automobile 
imports registered by the National Customs Service 
for the period from 2002 to 2008. The breakdown 
for each entry identifies the type of engine (gasoline 
or diesel), cylinder capacity in four categories (under 
1,000 cm3, between 1,000 cm3 and 1,500 cm3, between 
1,500 cm3 and 3,000 cm3, and over 3,000 cm3), whether 
the automobile is an off-road or four-wheel drive 
(4x4) vehicle, and the country of origin. For each of 
these groups of automobiles, the customs register lists 
the number of units imported, the country of origin, 
the average unit price and the standard deviation of 
the average price.11 Unfortunately, no breakdown 
of data by unit is available, nor was it possible to 
obtain a classification by model or even by make of 
automobile.
Table 1 gives a statistical summary of the data. 
The Quantity variable is the number of  vehicles 
imported per month in each of the 304 categories.12 
It provides the basis for calculating the logarithm of 
the monthly share of vehicle imports in each category, 
which is used as a dependent variable in the regression 
(log Smjt). Although no data are available to calculate 
the proportion of consumers who prefer the option 
of not having a car each month, there are data on 
11  There are records of imports from 45 countries, but 18 countries 
account for over 95% of  all vehicles imported. For this reason, 
the empirical analysis specifies the proportion of  automobiles 
imported from each of  these 18 and groups the rest into an 
“Other” category.
12  The 304 categories of automobile in the data arise from the 
interaction of: 4 engine sizes, 2 engine types, 2 vehicle types 
(automobile and off-roader or 4x4) and 19 countries of origin.
motorcycle imports, making it possible to calculate 
the market share of this outside option (log Sot), which 
is accordingly used in the empirical analysis.
The price variable is the average dollar unit price of 
automobiles in each category. The variables generated 
by the tariff  categories of the different automobile 
import entries were used to determine seven dummy 
variables capturing these characteristics: Engine 1,000 
for engine sizes under 1,000 cm3, Engine 1,500 for 
engine sizes between 1,000 cm3 and 1,500 cm3, Engine 
3,000 for engine sizes between 1,500 cm3 and 3,000 cm3, 
Engine 3,000+ for engine sizes over 3,000 cm3, 4x4 
for off-road or four-wheel drive vehicles, Diesel for 
diesel-engined vehicles and, lastly, Free Zone for all 
vehicles entering by one of the three free zones that 
exist in Chile (Arica, Iquique and Punta Arenas). The 
Tax variable is the monthly value, in dollars per litre, 
of the specific tax on gasoline. The imacec variable 
measures the monthly change in economic activity in 
the country, being based on the performance of 90% 
of the goods and services that make up gross domestic 
product (gdp); the monthly indicator of economic 
activity (imacec) is published by the Central Bank 
of Chile. Lastly, the Steel Price variable is the price 
of  the type of  stainless steel used by automobile 
producers, as published in the meps Stainless Steel 
Review on the basis of information from contracts 
between steel producers and consumers. Because steel 
is a production input in automobile manufacturing 
that ought not to be correlated with unobserved 
variables determining the demand for automobiles, 
its price is used as an instrumental variable for the 
price of automobiles when estimating demand.
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Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (11). 
Model (1) is the ordinary least squares estimation, 
and therefore does not take account of the possible 
endogeneity of automobile prices. In Chile, 100% of  
light passenger automobiles are imported, meaning 
that supply is determined simply by the international 
price, additionally bearing in mind that Chile is a small 
country. For this reason, the problem of simultaneity 
in determining the equilibrium price in the automobile 
market does not generate problems of identification. 
It is possible that there may be measurement errors in 
the price variable, however, as it is an average for each 
category of automobile. To take this possibility into 
account and remove a possible endogeneity bias when 
estimating price elasticity, equation (11) is estimated 
once again using the price of steel as an instrumental 
variable for the price of automobiles.
The empirical results are generally quite 
satisfactory. The regressions are able to explain 
about 56% of  the variation in the data, the signs of 
the coefficients are the expected ones for automobile 
demand and they are all statistically significant at a 
5% confidence interval. The demand for automobiles 
is greater for engine sizes larger than the omitted 
category of  engines smaller than 1,000 cm3, but 
the most considerable effect is seen with engines of 
between 1,500 cm3 and 3,000 cm3, which is where 
most demand is concentrated. Similarly, the findings 
reveal a positive effect on aggregate automobile 
demand of diesel-powered as compared to gasoline-
powered vehicles, and of four-wheel drive vehicles as 
compared to those with two-wheel drive. Although 
the size of the effects is fairly small, with elasticities 
of  between 0.2 and 0.4, this is consistent with 
the growing market share of  both diesel and 4x4 
automobiles over time. The positive repercussions 
of the Free Zone reflect the opportunity to import 
automobiles free of customs duties in two regions of 
the country, increasing demand there relative to the 
other regions of Chile. On average, everything else 
being constant, having a free zone increases relative 
demand for automobiles by 3.6%. The positive effect 
of the imacec on automobile demand is consistent 
with a positive income elasticity, but also reflects the 
TABLE 1
Statistical summary
 Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Quantity 151.22 343.63 1 3 544
Smjt 0.0101 0.0218 0.004 0.197
Price 12 379 11 663.8 2 000 152 352
Engine 1,000 0.034 0.165 0 1
Engine 1,500 0.099 0.278 0 1
Engine 3,000 0.214 0.376 0 1
Engine 3,000+ 0.131 0.295 0 1
4x4 0.087 0.126 0 1
Free Zone 0.203 0.327 0 1
Diesel 0.248 0.291 0 1
Tax 0.254 0.064 0.143 0.411
imacec 0.305 0.821 -1.8 1.7
Steel Price 3 421.25 1 328.71 2 091 4 732
Source: National Customs Department, Central Bank of  Chile and meps Stainless Steel Review.
Note: Average unit prices in dollars. 
Engine sizes are stated in cm3. 
imacec: Monthly indicator of  economic activity.
Free Zone: Arica, Iquique and Punta Arenas.
IV
results of the estimation
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role played by the economic cycle in vehicle imports. 
An increase of 1% in monthly economic activity is 
associated with an average increase of about 1.4% in 
automobile demand.
The coefficients of  greatest interest in the 
findings are those related to price and the fuel tax. 
Price elasticity for aggregate automobile demand 
in Chile, as evaluated at the mean of the sample, is 
-3.4. This value is not very different from the results 
obtained by other studies in the economic literature. 
In fact, while somewhat greater than the value of -2.4 
estimated by Trandel (1991), it is very close to the -3.28 
estimated by Goldberg (1995) and within the range of 
-3.0 to -4.5 estimated by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 
(1995).13 Price elasticities vary both by engine type 
and by engine size, reflecting consumers’ patterns of 
substitution between different types of automobiles. 
Automobiles with engines larger than 3,000 cm3 
have the greatest price elasticity (-3.71, evaluated 
at the mean of the sample), while automobiles with 
engines of between 1,500 cm3 and 3,000 cm3 have the 
lowest (-2.6, also evaluated at the mean).14 This range 
denotes a greater elasticity of demand between engine 
sizes than is found in developed countries. For the 
United States, for example, Bento and others (2009) 
estimate elasticities ranging from -1.44 for compact 
cars to -2.3 for minivans. The price elasticity of 4x4 
vehicles, lastly, is estimated at -3.83, making them the 
most price-elastic vehicles in Chile.
The fuel tax elasticity of  demand for diesel 
automobiles is estimated at -2.1, evaluated at the 
mean of the sample.15 Given that the diesel tax has 
been kept unchanged throughout the period, the effect 
of the tax differential between gasoline and diesel 
is identified in this elasticity. The magnitude of this 
elasticity, while smaller than the price elasticity, is not 
small from the standpoint of the role played by tax 
policy. Fuel tax elasticity partly captures the annual 
cost of using the automobile, with greater use requiring 
higher gasoline consumption, so that narrowing the 
tax rate gap between gasoline and diesel and levying a 
tax on diesel automobiles would considerably reduce 
the air pollution associated with diesel.
In particular, increasing the diesel tax from 
its current rate of 1.5 utm per cubic metre to 4.5 
utm and thereby equalizing it with the gasoline tax 
would reduce the proportion of diesel automobiles 
by almost 3 percentage points. In the case of  the 
Metropolitan Region, assuming the current growth 
in diesel automobiles remained constant, this would 
imply about 11,300 fewer imports of diesel automobiles 
in the next five years. Assuming each vehicle covered 
13  The first studies conducted showed much lower elasticities, 
however, with values in the range of -1 to -1.5 (see, for example, 
Chow, 1957; Suits, 1958; Wykoff, 1973).
14  Elasticities are calculated by the formula set out in (12) using 
market shares and price for the specific m group. Thus, for example, 
price elasticity for aggregate demand is calculated as -0.00028*12,379 
(1-0.0101)=-3.4. For the different types of automobile, elasticity is 
calculated in the same way but using the respective average price 
and market share for each group of automobiles: engine size over 
3,000 cm3, engine size between 1,500 cm3 and 3,000 cm3, and 4x4. 
See Nevo (2000) for details on the derivation and calculation of 
elasticities.
15  Tax elasticity is calculated by the formula set out in (13).
TABLE 2















































Country of  origin dummies Yes Yes
R² 0.557 0.563
F 141.7 152.1
N 8 307 8 307
Source: author’s estimates based on data detailed in table 1.
* Significant at 5%. 
Note: Model (1) estimated by ordinary least squares with 
robust errors; model (2) estimated by instrumental variables and 
bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions for errors.
Engine sizes are stated in cm3. 
Free Zone: Arica, Iquique and Punta Arenas.
imacec: Monthly indicator of  economic activity.
R2: Goodness of  f it .  F: Fischer test.  N: Number of 
observations.
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12,000 kilometres a year, this would mean 950 tons 
less nitrogen oxide and 88 tons less particulate matter 
being emitted annually. If a tax were additionally levied 
on diesel automobiles at a rate of 1% of vehicle value, 
the number of diesel vehicle imports would be cut by 
about 16,000 units over the next five years, leaving 
annual nitrogen oxide emissions 1,083 tons lower and 
emissions of particulate matter 106 tons lower.
V
Conclusions
In Chile, one of the important effects of the current 
difference in tax rates between gasoline and diesel is 
that it incentivizes the purchase of diesel automobiles. 
Thus, the proportion of the automobile fleet with diesel 
engines in the country rose from about 12% in 2002 
to 19% in 2008. Since diesel automobiles emit more 
nitrogen oxide than gasoline automobiles, as well as 
particulate matter, the externalities associated with air 
pollution from automobile use have been increasing. 
This is particularly significant for cities with high levels 
of pollution in winter, such as Santiago and Temuco. 
To be able to quantify the scale of this problem and 
consider tax policy alternatives that would allow 
externalities to be internalized by the owners of diesel 
automobiles, it is necessary to know the price and fuel 
tax elasticities of automobile demand.
The elasticities estimated in this study show that 
the demand for diesel automobiles is quite sensitive to 
vehicle price and the tax differential between gasoline 
and diesel. This provides a basis for implementing 
a tax policy involving equalization of the gasoline 
and diesel tax rates and the introduction of a tax on 
diesel automobiles that would be quite effective in 
reducing externalities, and most particularly in reducing 
emissions of nitrogen oxide and particulate matter. 
To obtain a more precise estimate of the effects of 
a tax policy of this type, it would be worthwhile for 
future research to carry out an even more detailed 
disaggregation of  automobile demand than this 
study has. It is particularly important to consider 
the different makes and models of  automobile so 
that consumers’ patterns of  substitution between 
different automobiles in response to tax rises can be 
studied with greater accuracy.
(Original: Spanish)
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